Intervention and the foreign exchange risk premium: an empirical investigation of daily effects by Owen F. Humpage & William P. Osterberg
Working Paper 9009 
INTERVENTION AND THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK PREMIUM: 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF DAILY EFFECTS 
by Owen F. Humpage and William P. Osterberg 
Owen F. Humpage is an economic 
advisor and William P. Osterberg 
is an economist at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland.  Kyle 
Fleming provided able research 
assistance.  The authors also 
gratefully acknowledge the technical 
assistance of Ralph Day. 
Working papers of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland are preliminary 
materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. 
The views stated herein are those of 
the authors and not necessarily 
those of  the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Cleveland or of the Board of 




Currency markets have witnessed a sharp increase in government 
intervention since 1985.  Many observers believe that this intervention 
promoted the dollar's  depreciation  between 1985 and early 1987,  and that 
intervention  has since helped to stabilize dollar exchange rates. This paper 
tests for a systematic effect of daily dollar intervention on exchange rate 
risk premia.  We test for both portfolio balance effects and signaling 
influences by using daily data on central  bank intervention (in dollars) 
against both the yen and the West German mark.  Following work by Dominguez 
(1989) and Loopesko (1984),  we measure the daily risk premium in terms of the 
deviation from uncovered interest parity.  However,  we follow other empirical 
analyses of exchange rates and allow for generalized conditional 
autoregressive heteroscedasticity (GARCH).  Some evidence is found for both 
the portfolio balance and signaling channels. 
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The recent emphasis on foreign exchange intervention by several large 
industrialized nations has renewed an interest in the study of channels 
through which intervention  may operate.  Some research suggests that 
intervention  may be responsible for the failure of exchange market efficiency 
models. 
From a policy standpoint,  if intervention has an impact on exchange rates, 
then the channel of its influence must be identified in order to determine 
whether it is an independent  policy tool.  For this reason,  most studies focus 
on sterilized intervention,  which by definition does not affect the monetary 
base.  Sterilized intervention  may operate through either the portfolio 
balance or signaling channel. 
Most empirical studies have found little support for the portfolio balance 
channel.  Evidence of a signaling role is somewhat stronger;  however, 
disentangling the two effects is difficult. 
This paper uses confidential daily data on G-3  central bank intervention 
to test for the presence of both portfolio balance and signaling effects of 
intervention on exchange rate risk premia. Use of high-frequency  daily data 
allows us to capture the relationships among intervention,  volatility,  and 
excess returns. 
The existence of a risk premium is one possible explanation for the poor 
out-of-sample  forecasting  performance of exchange rate models.  Variances of 
exchange rates seem to show persistence,  with distinct periods of low and high 
volatility.  Various researchers have suggested that policy shifts may be 
related to volatility in asset prices.  Thus, it may be useful to think of 
the impact of intervention  as operating specifically through a risk premium. 
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exchange.  A widely used approach is to analyze the relationship between 
forward rates and spot rates.  Hodrick (1989),  for example,  relates the 
forward premium to conditional means and variances of market fundamentals. 
One disadvantage of approaches that relate risk premia to fundamentals is that 
they do not permit testing with high-frequency  data.  However, a method that 
can be applied to daily analyses of intervention is to analyze the 
measure of realized excess returns suggested by the uncovered interest parity 
(UIP) condition.  Two previous studies (Loopesko [I9841 and Dominguez [1989]) 
have taken this approach.  This paper differs by using more recent data and 
modeling the conditional  variance of the excess returns. 
We take advantage of recent advances in modeling conditional variances in 
asset returns (generalized autoregressive conditional  heteroscedasticity 
[GARCH]), particularly as applied to exchange rates.  Baillie and 
Bollerslev's 1989 study is one of many to find evidence for GARCH in exchange 
rates.  To allow for the possibility that the conditional  variance of the 
excess return influences its mean (GARCH-M), and that intervention influences 
the conditional  variance,  we utilize a variant of GARCH-M  that allows the 
error term to have a conditional student-t  distribution.  In  previous 
applications to exchange rate data, the student-t  distribution  has explained 
leptokurtosis (Baillie and Bollerslev). 
Our analysis confirms the existence of portfolio balance and signaling 
channels,  but differs from other studies in regard to which countries' 
operations had significant impacts.  Although evidence of GARCH is present, 
the conditional variance does not influence the conditional mean (no GARCH-M). 
In addition,  we find evidence of day-of-the-week  effects. 
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Theorv: Channels of Influence for Intervention 
Theory has focused on sterilized intervention for two reasons.  l  First, 
the effects of unsterilized intervention may be indistinguishable from those 
of monetary policy.  Second,  most large industrialized nations claim that 
intervention is sterilized. 
Most analyses of intervention utilize the portfolio balance approach 
(Branson and Henderson [1985]).  With risk-averse  investors and imperfect 
substitutability  of assets of differing currencies,  shifts in the relative 
supplies of assets may induce changes in rates of return via the exchange 
rate.  However,  under Ricardian equivalence, sterilized intervention would 
have no impact,  even with imperfect substitutability (Backus and Kehoe 
[I9881  ) . 
The other channel through which intervention may operate is signaling, 
or the provision of new information to the market (Obstfeld [I9891 and 
Dominguez [1989]).  Intervention  can provide an effective and credible signal 
about future monetary policy if 1) the central bank has inside information 
and the incentive to reveal it truthfully and 2) the market has the ability to 
determine the credibility of that information.  Intervention may be preferable 
to other signals because it does not require the central bank to change the 
monetary base.  On the other hand, this may make it easier to renege on the 
implied policy.  The fact that the central bank puts its own money on the line 
by intervening  has been cited by some as a reason  why intervention may have 
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coordination  may either strengthen its signal,  or it may give some the 
incentive to "free ride,"  if such actions are undetectable by the market. 
Evidence 
While most investigations of the portfolio balance channel conclude that 
changes in the currency denomination  of  bond holdings do not influence 
exchange rates (see Weber [I9861 for a survey),  Danker et al. (1984),  Loopesko 
(1984),  Johnson (1988),  and Ghosh (1989) find evidence supportive of 
such a channel.  However,  even if changes in the relative stocks do influence 
exchange rates,  intervention still may have no meaningful impact,  since the 
volume of sterilized intervention is small relative to the total stock of 
assets. 
Evidence for a signaling channel is somewhat  more consistent.  Dominguez 
(1988) finds that,  between 1977 and 1981,  the relationship between 
intervention and money-supply  surprises is consistent with the idea that 
intervention conveys information about future monetary policy.  The response 
of exchange rates to intervention suggests that whether the market bets for or 
against intervention depends on the central bank's  credibility in conveying 
such information.  Using daily data,  Humpage (1988) finds evidence that 
initial intervention has an effect on exchange rates,  but subsequent 
intervention does not.  Dominguez (1989) looks at the impact of official 
sterilized intervention and coordination from 1985 to 1987,  and attempts to 
distinguish longer-term  influences by using one-month  and three-month  interest 
and exchange rates.  Results indicate that coordinated intervention  may have a 
longer-term  influence than unilateral intervention,  the impact of  which was 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmless consistent.  On the other hand,  Humpage (1984) finds that U.S. monetary 
authorities react to smooth,  unanticipated exchange rate movements,  but notes 
no evidence of an expectations effect.  Dominguez and Frankel (1990) attempt 
to disentangle portfolio balance from expectation influences through 
the use of exchange rate expectations data and newspaper accounts of 
intervention.  They find evidence for both effects. 
Loopesko (1984) and Dominguez (1989),  the two studies that take the 
approach closest to that of this paper,  use the UIP condition to test the 
impact of daily intervention.  Loopesko examines the joint hypothesis of 
perfect asset substitutability and exchange market efficiency using daily data 
from 1975 to 1981.  Cumulative central bank intervention that could have been 
known to market participants is the independent variable used to test for a 
portfolio balance effect.  Lagged values of the realized profits and exchange 
rate are included to test for market efficiency.  Although the joint 
hypothesis is resoundingly rejected,  identification of the influence of the 
independent variables is clouded by the possibility that variables may have 
been omitted,  or that not all of the measured intervention  has been observed. 
111.  Risk Premia in Exchange Rates 
There is no consensus as to the appropriate theoretical framework for 
exchange rate risk premia.  Lucas's  (1982) intertemporal dynamic two-country 
model implies that risk premia should be related to preferences and to the 
stochastic  behavior of the driving processes, such as monetary policy.  The 
intertemporal capital asset pricing model (Engel and Rodrigues [1987], 
Giovannini and Jorion [1989],  and Mark [1988]) suggests that risk premia 
should be related to covariances among asset returns.  The consumption-based 
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implications for covariation between asset returns and intertemporal marginal 
rates of substitution in  utility. Option pricing theory implies that risk 
premia are imbedded in foreign currency options prices (Lyons [1988],  McCurdy 
and Morgan [1988]).  Tests of all of these approaches have had mixed results. 
Hodrick (1987) and Baillie and McMahon (1989) provide excellent overviews of 
this literature. 
Evidence favoring the existence of a risk premium in foreign exchange 
rates is indirect.  Violation of the UIP condition,  rejection of unbiasedness 
in the forward market, and poor out-of-sample  forecasting performance of 
log-linear  models that rely on first moments suggest that a risk premium may 
exist.  However,  most tests of UIP or of the relationship  between forward and 
future spot rates are joint examinations of market efficiency,  perfect 
substitutability,  and capital mobility.  Nonetheless,  evidence of conditional 
heteroscedasticity in exchange rates naturally leads to attempts to explain 
time variation in the conditional variance of exchange rates. 
Many of the theoretical approaches mentioned above imply that the 
conditional variance of exchange rates should be related to time-varying 
conditional covariances that involve exogenous processes such as money or 
output.  However, testing these theories would require using data of no 
greater than monthly frequency.  As Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) point out, 
evidence of time variation in conditional variance is weaker with such data. 
Most efforts to model the conditional variances of exchange rates utilize 
ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) or its variants (GARCH, 
GARCH-M).  ARCH allows for conditional normality combined with a leptkurtic, 
symmetric unconditional distribution consistent with the typical fat-tailed 
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GARCH in  which the conditional distribution is student-t  successfully  models 
heteroscedasticity in the first-difference  of the logarithm of daily exchange 
rates.  Hsieh (1989) confirms the ability of ARCH or GARCH,  in combination 
with various assumptions regarding nonnormality,  to remove heteroscedasticity 
from similar data.  Both Baillie and Bollerslev and Hsieh (1988) find 
day-of-the-week  effects in exchange rate data. 
The limitations of ARCH as a vehicle for explaining conditional variance 
are pointed out by Pagan and Hong (1988),  Nelson (1987),  and others.  Hodrick 
(1987,  p. 110) argues that ARCH may be inappropriate for analyzing volatility 
in exchange rates.  If  high-risk  premia are rooted in policy uncertainty,  then 
clarification by policymakers should reduce them.  However,  ARCH implies 
persistence in conditional variance, so the implied risk premia would only be 
reduced after a period of lower ex-post  volatility.  The role of policy regime 
shifts in explaining exchange market volatility is explored empirically by 
Lastrapes (1989). 
IV.  Interest Paritv and Excess Return 
We use the UIP condition to generate our measure of the exchange rate 
risk premium.  An alternative would be to use the covered interest parity 
condition,  which involves forward contracts.  However, forward contracts are 
intended for delivery at least one month in the future,  which,  with daily 
data,  would entail a loss of degrees of freedom in order to account for 
serially correlated errors induced by overlapping forecast intervals. UIP 
suggests utilizing equation (1). 
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Rt  = domestic interest rate, 
Rt*  = foreign interest rate, 
St  - exchange rate (foreign currency price of U.S. dollars),  and 
RETt - excess return. 
Here, the investor does not cover the transaction by selling forward,  but 
instead forms expectations of the spot rate (EISt+l] for a one-day 
investment), which is uncertain at the time of the transaction. 
We utilize daily data on interest rates,  exchange rates,  and intervention 
Timing conventions in the foreign exchange markets require the buying and 
selling of currency to be completed prior to the investment.  Consider an 
investor who places funds overnight.  This investor buys West German marks on 
day t-2  for delivery on day t.  On day t-1,  he sells the marks for dollars 
that are to be delivered on day t+l.  On day t,  his marks are collected and 
invested overnight.  On day t+l, he receives his marks,  which he had 
previously contracted to sell.  These considerations,  together with the 
assumption that EISt+l] = St+l, imply equation (2). 
where the excess return has been decomposed into a risk premium (RP) and a 
forecast error (FE).  Since we utilize St+l instead of its expectation,  an 
MA(1)  term is introduced into FEt.  A  regression of RETt on variables that 
would be in the investor's information set at transaction time provides a 
joint test of informational efficiency and absence of a risk premium.  Hence, 
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t-3  and explains RETt,  we would have evidence of an influence on risk premia 
if this market were informationally efficient. 
We introduce intervention in two forms.  To test for its influence 
through the portfolio balance channel,  the total of the two countries' 
cumulative intervention is entered at t-3.  If this measure captures a 
portfolio balance effect,  then the identity of the countries should be 
immaterial.  To examine this, each country's cumulative total is 
entered separately,  as well.  As indicated above,  this is a joint test of 
efficiency and the existence of a risk premium.  In addition,  in the absence 
of a portfolio balance channel, this test may indicate a signaling role for 
intervention.  To further test for a signaling effect,  we distinguish between 
coordinated and unilateral intervention at t-3. 
V.  An Empirical Model 
A substantial body of literature suggests that a martingale process aptly 
describes movements in exchange rates,  and that the variances of the first 
differences of exchange rates are heteroscedastic.  Here,  we model the 
forecast error with the GARCH procedure used by Baillie and Bollerslev (1989). 
The residuals from the conditional mean equation for RETt are assumed to be 
generated  by a conditional student-t  distribution, and the conditional 
variance of the residuals,  ht,  is modeled as an  ARMA  process. 
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explanatory variables,  which includes intervention,  an intercept, four 
day-of-the-week  dummies,  and dummies for missing data and vacation days.  In 
equation (4),  the error ut is allowed to follow an  MA(1)  process.  The term 
rhtPallows for the conditional variance (p-1)  or the conditional standard 
deviation (p=.5) to influence the excess return.  Although we do not present a 
theoretical model for this effect,  it is implied by models such as that in 
Hodrick (1989). 
Equation (5)  indicates that the distribution  of the et conditional on  the 
information set It-1  is student-t,  with mean zero,  variance ht,  and 
distributional  parameter v.  If  v exceeds 30,  this distribution is 
approximately normal.  Equation (6)  shows that we utilize a GARCH(1,l) 
parameterization,  with an intercept. 
Preliminarv Tests and Procedures 
A standard ARMA  analysis of RETt did not help us to distinguish between 
AR(1)  and MA(1)  representations.  Since overlapping forecast intervals suggest 
an MA(1)  form,  that is the one with which we proceed.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests reject the hypothesis of a unit root in  Yt. 
In order to examine the sensitivity of our results on the significance of 
intervention on excess returns,  we omit the daily dummies, the MA(1)  term,  and 
the ARCH-  in-mean  term (ht or ht  .  5, from the mean equation.  The extent to 
which the residuals are nonwhite is indicated by the reported Q statistics 
(Q[15]  indicates that 15 lags were utilized).  ~/(h~-~)  adjusts the usual Q 
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squared residuals,  which may indicate ARCH effects.  It,  too, is adjusted for 
2  heteroscedasticity,  and then reported as Q fit.  The parameter v indicates the 
extent to which the distribution deviates from normality. The sample measure 
of skewness aids in indicating the success of our distributional assumptions 
in modeling the conditional variance.  Finally,  we report the sample analogue 
to kurtosis,  3(v-2)/(v-4),  where appropriate. 
Data 
The sample period is August 3,  1984 to February 19,  1990,  and there 
are 1,770  daily observations,  excluding lags.  We obtained the exchange rate 
and interest rate data from the Paris market through DRIFACS PLUS (1988).  The 
ultimate source is Credit Lyonnais,  Paris.  Yen-dollar  and mark-dollar 
exchange rates are constructed as cross-rates  for each currency quoted against 
the French franc.  The exchange rate data are averages of bid and ask quotes 
as of 2:00 p.m. in Paris.  Interest rates are overnight Eurocurrency deposit 
rates,  quoted on a 360-day  basis, as of 9:30 a.m.;  they are converted to a 
daily basis.  The market chosen is the only one in which we found overnight 
Euroyen deposit rates. 
Intervention data are daily net purchases of dollars by the United States, 
West Germany,  and Japan,  provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System.  Since the data are measured in dollars,  we avoid the need to 
construct dollar measures of intervention using the exchange rate,  which 
would imbed simultaneity into our analysis.  Over the period investigated, 
virtually all U.S. intervention  was against the mark or yen.  The single 
exception was a purchase of $16.4 million equivalent British pounds in 
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intervention,  but not intervention by other large central banks,  which tend to 
focus intervention on their own currency's exchange rate rather than on the 
yen-dollar  or mark-dollar  rate.  Moreover, their currency's relationship 
against the dollar need not be the objective of the intervention:  Many 
participants in the European Monetary System (EMS) intervene in dollars to 
maintain their currencies within EMS limits.  Although third-party 
intervention  may affect the yen-dollar  or the mark-dollar  exchange rate,  the 
impact is often caused by the aggregation of purchases and sales of dollars 
undertaken independently by many different countries. 
Results 
The portfolio balance channel and cumulative intervention 
If the portfolio balance channel is operative, the total change in 
relative portfolios should be important to the investor.  In  Table I,  we use 
as our intervention measure the total of U.S. and West German purchases of 
U.S. dollars against the mark as of date t-3. Since intervention is measured 
at the end of the day,  this is information that investors could have had. 
Table I  indicates that an increase in dollar purchases tends to result in 
significantly increased (at the 1 percent level) dollar excess returns. 
In the absence of an agreed-upon  theory of the determination of exchange 
rate risk premia, it is unclear how we should interpret the sign of the impact 
of intervention.  However, the portfolio balance approach suggests that the 
excess return on dollar assets must increase in order to compensate investors 
for holding a greater stock of dollar assets.  The positive coefficient 
implies that an increase in the stock of dollar assets (a negative 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmvalue) is associated with a decrease in the risk premium.  This is 
inconsistent with what the portfolio balance approach implies.  The 
significance of the cumulative intervention measure is in agreement  with 
Loopesko (1984),  who unfortunately does not report the direction of the effect 
that she finds. 
Of course,  we cannot claim to have distinguished between a portfolio 
channel and the possibility that intervention  has had a role in signaling new 
information to the market.  For example,  an examination of equation (2) 
confirms that,  ceteris paribus,  RET and St-1  are positively correlated.  The 
risk premia would be reflected in E[St-I].  However, the forecast error may be 
correlated  with new information that intervention could provide. 
In  Table 11,  we split the total cumulative intervention  measure utilized 
in Table I  into U.S. and West German purchases.  If a portfolio balance 
channel is operative, the identity of the purchaser should be inconsequential. 
Thus,  we would expect both variables to be significant.  Results indicate, 
however,  that only West German purchases of dollars have a significant impact 
on excess returns (about 10  percent).  The sign of the effects is again 
positive. 
Tables I11 and IV indicate the results for the excess return of dollars 
over yen.  There is no evidence that intervention  has a significant influence. 
The signal.ing  channel and coordinated versus uncoordinated intervention 
If intervention  works through providing signals to the market, then it 
need not be cumulative, and it might be ~.?cessary  to distinguish between 
uncoordinated and unilateral interventions; this study measures both at t-3. 
If intervention is coordinated (both countries intervene in the same 
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